Edith Cowan University

Research Online
Australian Information Security Management
Conference

Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events

1-1-2011

Help or hindrance: the practicality of applying security standards
in healthcare
Patricia A H Williams
Edith Cowan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ism
Part of the Information Security Commons
DOI: 10.4225/75/57b54c74cd8cd
9th Australian Information Security Management Conference, Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, 5th
-7th December, 2011
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ism/132

HELP OR HINDRANCE: THE PRACTICALITY OF APPLYING
SECURITY STANDARDS IN HEALTHCARE
Patricia A H Williams
secau Security Research Centre, Edith Cowan University
trish.williams@ecu.edu.au

Abstract
The protection of patient information is now more important as a national e-health system approaches reality in
Australia. The major challenge for health care providers is to understand the importance information security
whilst also incorporating effective protection into established workflow and daily activity. Why then, when it is
difficult for IT and security professionals to navigate through and apply the myriad of information security
standards, do we expect small enterprises such as primary health care providers to also be able to do this. This is
an onerous and impractical task without significant assistance. In the development of the new Computer and
Information Security Standards (CISS) for Australian General Practice, a consistent and iterative process for the
interpretation and application of international standards was used. This involved both the interpretation of the
standards and the application of knowledge to create a practical but acceptable level of security for the primary
healthcare environment. From a security perspective such practical application of standards poses the
dichotomous challenge (and criticism) of how much security is sufficient versus how much can the primary
healthcare environment manage. This paper describes the path of development from standards to implementation
using the CISS as an example. It is concluded that more practical assistance is required by the security profession
to support the national e-health initiative if Australia is to provide a safe and secure healthcare environment.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
A national e-health system for Australia is rapidly becoming a reality. The political drive for a Personally
Controlled Electronic Health record (PCEHR) has seen the rapid progression of the underlying e-health
infrastructure. The PCEHR will provide a “secure, electronic record of your medical history, stored and shared
in a network of connected systems. The PCEHR will bring key health information from a number of different
systems together and present it in a single view” (NEHTA, 2011). This is not designed to replace the complete
patient record held at the local medical practitioner but to provide a collated view of the patient health summary
that will be able to be shared with other health providers. As such, the PCEHR is not of itself the basis for the ehealth system; it is only one part of it. Thus the protection of patient information is now more important as a
national e-health system approaches reality in Australia. The major challenge for health care providers is to
understand the importance information security whilst also incorporating effective protection into established
workflow and daily activity.
The development of a coherent and interoperable e-health system in Australia is made more complicated by the
division of control between the federal (national) and state governments for public healthcare services as well as
the strong private healthcare sector in the primarily private primary care sector, and some allied and hospital
services. Therefore, information security protection for smaller healthcare providers, such as those in general
practice, is particularly important and the focus of this paper. At the heart of creating an infrastructure that
supports information sharing are standards to ensure interoperability and consistent information management.
Information security is an integral part of this architecture. Since information security is an established and well
developed discipline, the existing mature practices are a key component of this architecture. Why then, when it is
difficult for IT and security professionals to navigate through and apply the myriad of information security
standards, do we expect small enterprises such as primary health care providers to also be able to do this.
Standards, policies and recognized practice do not need to be redeveloped for the healthcare environment.
However, there is no doubt that they do need to be contextualised and modelled to fit into a well established
health framework, rather than attempting to cascade over and impose a regime of security (as is the case in the
corporate environment) that so obviously does not fit well into the healthcare setting . This paper discusses the
standards that are relevant to the primary healthcare setting and provide a case study of how these can be
interpreted and applied. This development has been an integral part of the development of the new Royal
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Australian College of General Practitioners, Computer and Information Security Standards, and the paper gives
this as an example of what work is needed in this area.

SECURITY STANDARDS FOR HEALTHCARE
Established and accepted information security management planning includes, risk assessment, contingency
planning (business impact analysis, incident response, disaster recovery and business continuity) and protection
controls and monitoring (Whilman & Mattord, 2008). In the security community it is widely accepted that
standards must drive policy which then informs decision making and good security practice.
The application of standards is not an insignificant task. “One of the great challenges facing IT professionals is
how to navigate through the sea of regulatory compliances, industry standards, and numerous security and IT
operational best practice standards and frameworks” (Tordoff, 2008). Further, complexity is apparent in that
standards tend to focus on process rather than application and implementation. Indeed, it is not surprising that
standards must be contextualised to synergise with an organisation’s culture, support its mission and fit into
established work processes (Hone & Eloff, 2002).
All organizations have multiple legislative regulations to comply with, and healthcare has the added professional
and ethical requirements inherent to the environment. What is required for demonstrable defensible practice are
cohesive and realistically implementable information security plans that can be assessed and measured for
protection compliance, and can be used as a guide for improvement. It must be accepted that information
security is always going to be a ‘work in progress’ and that 100% security is rarely, if ever, achievable; indeed,
some would argue that it is impossible to achieve. For instance, hacking is a sophisticated attack mechanism and
therefore unpredictable and difficult to prevent. In the USA, breach notification legalisation in enacted which
provides some measure of the enormity of the problems now being encountered in regards to breaches from
malicious and human error (Hancock, 2005).
The problems with security standards application
The major challenge for health care providers is to understand the importance of information security whilst also
incorporating effective protection into established workflow and daily activity. This is an onerous and
impractical task without significant assistance. This challenge does not only reside with the healthcare profession
and those in the context to which the standards are applied, but also for the security profession and the standards
community who advise and set the standards. They also need to understand a broader perspective on the realistic
application of these standards. Indeed, even the standards community recognize that applying standards needs
contextualization, as is evidenced by the development of ISO27799 from ISO27002. Table 1 shows the
standards that are directly relevant to the development of practical information security guidance in the primary
healthcare setting.
Standards exist to ensure a secure system and provide associated minimum technical specifications. It is
therefore necessary to translate a standard into policy and then procedures specific to the environment of use.
Yet, this has been problematic in the healthcare environment. Policy derived from standards must be singular
and continually monitored if it is to be effective (Owens et al, 2001). The real and perceived cost overhead,
which whilst reducing risk and contributing to information protection does not overtly contribute to patient care
simply adds to the misunderstanding of the importance of security at the management level. To date whilst
quoting risk assessment as an integral part of security, it is an task that is not really assessed, whether from being
too difficult or time consuming to be undertaken, and its omission limits both the understanding of the issues and
the importance of what realistically needs protection. Whilst the Australian HB 174-2003 handbook features best
practice control measures for information security and is designed for a non-technical readership, it does not
alone assist in implementation application. Similar to other guidelines, it does not cater for specific types of
health providers or organisations and therefore contains a more complicated picture for those with minimal
security knowledge.
The issue with using un-interpreted standards is the level of knowledge and expertise that is required to apply
and implement them, the resourcing that is often associated with this in terms of time, and the impetus to
undertake the task. In the healthcare environment this issue has been evident from research and experience in the
field (Williams, 2008). The autonomous nature of staff in healthcare and specifically in smaller healthcare
organisations reinforces informal and individualised work practices. This can be a barrier where a lack of fit
between policy and work practice occurs (Adams and Blandford, 2005). Part of the problem is to create a culture
around the integration and recognition of security in the work place. This however will always be a challenge in
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an environment that is not corporately based and where security is not considered integral to core business.
However, where treating patients and healthcare are the main focus, the correct and protective management of
healthcare information is essential, particularly as the connectedness of the e-health environment is gradually put
in place. The following section outlines how development of a minimised and simplified process using the
relevant standards in Table 1 has been achieved with the 2011 Royal Australian College of General Practitioners
(RACGP) Computer and Information Security Standards (RACGP, 2011).

Standard

Description

Relevance to the application to
general practice

ISO/IEC 27001:2005 - Information
technology -- Security techniques -Information security management
systems -- Requirements.

General business implementation Incorporates basic processes for
not tailored for healthcare. Part of risk assessment and identification of
the ISO 27000 group of standards overarching principles.
for
Information
Security
Management Systems

ISO
27002
(previously
ISO
Information
17799:2005)
technology - Security techniques Code of practice for information
security management

Developed
from
ISO/IEC
17799:2000. It provides best
practice guidelines for Information
Security
Management
Systems
implementation.

Provides detailed areas of security
with background explanation of
importance. It also provides some
(but not all) indication of technical
and social measures required in
general principle form.

ISO 27799-(Health informatics - Applied the context for using ISO
information security management in 27002 to healthcare setting in
health using ISO/IEC 27002
general and incorporates aspects of
interoperability considerations.

Whilst incorporates controls these
are not prioritized. They were
referred to complete parts of the
matrix for risk assessment and
controls once the categorization and
prioritization
of
risks
were
established.

HB 174-2003- Information security This handbook was derived from
management - Implementation guide NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 and
details the controls specifically for
for the health sector
the health sector in Australia.

This provided grounding in the
application for the Australian
scenario. Whilst aimed at small to
medium enterprises it still does not
embrace the difficulties faced by
primary care practices in lack of IT
and security expertise, It is also now
out of date in some areas.

ISO 31000:2009 Risk management – Provides generic guidance on risk Used to ensure comprehensive
principles and guidelines.
principles.
coverage of risk issues.
HB 231 - 2004 Information security Generic guidance on
risk management guidelines.
implementation of a risk
management process.

Used in conjunction with ISO31000
to provide the practical aspects and
determine to what extent these
applied to the primary care
environment.

HB 292 - 2006 A practitioners guide Provides generic but accepted and Used specifically to inform the
to business continuity management; integrated approach to business development of the business
and HB 293 - 2006 Executive guide continuity in the business and continuity section.
to business continuity management. corporate environments.
Guidelines contributing to the Australian primary care information protection principles
x Information Privacy Principles under the Privacy Act 1988
x NIST (2008). Computer security incident handling guide. Special Publication 800-61. National Institute
of Standards and Technology.
x Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. (2006). National Privacy Principles
Table 1. Standards relevant to development of practical guidance to primary care in information security.

240

CASE STUDY IN APPLICATION TO HEALTHCARE
In the development of the new Computer and Information Security Standards for Australian General Practice, a
systematic process for the analysis and application of international standards was used. This involved both the
interpretation of the standards and the application of knowledge to create a practical but acceptable level of
security for the primary healthcare environment. The process was systematic as each standard was reviewed in
order and used to inform the development of the major risk-control matrix shown in Table 2.
As in many specific areas of healthcare and business for small organisations, it is the time and expertise factors
that interfere with the development of good practice in security. With this in mind, it was necessary to use the
authors’ experience and knowledge of both the security and healthcare areas to formulate a simplified but
effective process for ensuring good security practice and protection in general practices. For this objective the
standards in Table 1 were systematically reviewed and used to guide this development, whilst consistently
applying the knowledge of what was possible and practical for practices to undertake themselves. Table 2
indicates the synthesis of this into a simplified form. Table 2 is an extract only of the full table in the published
RACGP Computer and Information Security Standards Workbook (RACGP, 2011), and in the published version
each dot point is also cross-referenced to the RACGP Standard for further explanation.
It should be noted that this is not the whole process and other aspects integral to the management of the
information security process were also included, such as establishing responsibilities, contact points, asset
identification etc, However, these are not provided here for the purpose of this case study. What was required
was to identify the common threats to the primary care environment and provide associated mitigations without
making the requirements is large a task that it would not be undertaken at all and therefore not useful. The
selection of threats also included link to the privacy principles as well as the ethical and professional aspects of
clinical practice and the protection of patient information.
Risk Assessment – Threat, vulnerability and controls
Threat /
Risk Source

Disruption /
Impact

Vulnerability

Suggested Appropriate
Controls

Controls
Existing

Human – Unintentional- – Internal (insider threats/staff/authorised third parties)
Error / omissions
- Financial
- Legitimate
<practice
Staff training in policy and
e.g. deletion of
loss
access to
to
procedures
- Disrupt
files, failure to
systems
complete>
check backup

Inadvertent access
by staff

operational
activities
-Breach of
integrity
(inadvertent
information
modification
or destruction)
- Violation of
legislation or
regulation
- Breach of
confidentiality
(potential
information
disclosure)

- Lack of
training

- Legitimate
access to
systems by
staff
- Lack of
formal
implemented
policy and
procedures,
particularly
password
controls

Required
(to action)
<practice
to
complete>

Person
Responsible

<practice to
complete>

Backup and recovery
procedures in place

Implemented and
monitored access control
policy and procedure
Breach reporting in place
Confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements
signed
Agreements with third
parties signed
Password protected screen
savers
Limit access to system
utilities

Inadvertent viewing
of information by
non-staff

- Violation of
legislation or
regulation
- Breach of
confidentiality

- Lack of
appropriate
access control
- Staff not
following
policy

Staff training in policy and
procedures
Clear desk and clear screen
policy
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Risk Assessment – Threat, vulnerability and controls
Threat /
Risk Source

Disruption /
Impact

Vulnerability

Suggested Appropriate
Controls

Controls
Existing

Required
(to action)

Person
Responsible

Technical – Deliberate
Malicious code
(e.g. virus)

- Disrupt
operational
activities
- Denial or
degradation of
service
- Data loss
- Breach of
integrity

- Inadequate
network and
internet
protection
- Lack of staff
training
-Not keeping
anti-virus
updates current
- Spam
filtering

Anti-malware software
automatically regularly
updated
Regular precautionary scans
of information systems
Spam filtering
Staff education on email
attachments
Prohibit use of unauthorised
software
Block use of mobile code
e.g. use web browser
security to limit program
add-ons (unknown
ActiveX)
Limit use of file
transfer/peer-to-peer
applications unless essential
to normal operations
Control or prohibit use of
external and personal
devices such as USB

Information loss

- Violation of
legislation or
regulation
- Adversely
affect
reputation
- Breach of
confidentiality

- Poor or no
backup
procedures
- Lack of
appropriate
access control

Effective, monitored
backup procedures
Breach reporting to
authorities
Segregation of system
utilities from application
software (seek advice from
technical service provider).
Limit access to system
utilities

Denial of Service
(DoS - attempt to
make computer
resources
unavailable)

- Loss or
degradation of
network
capacity
- Loss of
Internet
connectivity

Configure Intrusion
detection system to detect
DoS
Firewall configuration to
block specified network
traffic
Block outgoing connections
to Internet relay chat (IRC),
instant messaging and peerto-peer services(seek advice
from technical service
provider)

Table 2. Threats, vulnerabilities and controls for general practice security (RACGP, 2011, extract of Table 22)
Whilst only an abstract of the matrix is given in Table 2, the full matrix includes the six categories of
x Human – Unintentional- – Internal (insider threats/staff/authorised third parties)
x Human – Deliberate – Internal (insider threats/staff/authorised third parties)
x Human – Deliberate – External
x Technical – Unintentional
x Technical – Deliberate
x Environmental
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It is clear that most explicit environments and domains have specific security threats and vulnerabilities, and as
such the majority of the risk and control matrix can be completed by those knowledgeable of security and the
specific domain to which it is being applied. Therefore the whole process of implementing security can be made
more straightforward. Subsequently, a medical practice can record the existing measures they already have in
place and identify easily those that need to be considered. This can be done to a greater extent without the
assistance of external support providers in the first instance, although the matrix does identify when this
assistance may be required.
In a similar development manner, the business continuity section of the workbook (deemed to be an area of
major concern to the profession and poorly executed in many general practices) was also developed to assist
practices in indentifying their critical functions, manual or replacement procedures in the event of the system
failure, and corrective actions using simple tables to both create and define logical procedures. The standards
and workbook were reviewed and validated by other experts in the security and healthcare field, the RACGP ehealth unit, general practitioners, practice managers, as well as the National Standing Committee for E-Health.

CONCLUSION
From a security perspective, the practical application of standards poses the dichotomous challenge (and
criticism) of how much security is sufficient versus how much can the primary healthcare environment manage.
The recent development of the RACGP Computer and Information Security Standards and Workbook has taken
six months of interpretation and application of the standards. They demonstrate that practical assistance can be
developed in such as way to assist primary care practices to put in place sufficient and effective security
measures. This standard will now be incorporated into the RACGP national accreditation of general practice and
will provide evidence of a basic level of security practice by healthcare providers. For medical practices it will
also offer a method for demonstrable practice and guidance in improvement in practice as some aspects are
aspirational. To the healthcare profession it indicates the importance of information security in understandable
terms, and provides a basis for the extension of security measures that will be necessary for connection to the
national e-health system which (driven by the political landscape) will begin in earnest in July 2012. It is
intended that this RACGP standard will be extended to incorporate all office based medical practices in 2012.
The security profession must work together with the healthcare profession to provide both technical expertise
and increased social awareness of the importance of information security. Whilst this may not be a necessity
peculiar to the healthcare domain, it is proving a challenge in the current progressive e-health environment. It is
highly likely that the perception of information security and its importance will develop as the e-health
information sharing situation evolves in Australia over the next few years. Whilst some of this may be driven by
legislation and the altered information sharing environment shifts, this perception will not occur automatically.
Ultimately, it will require a change of healthcare organisational culture to reframe the importance and
significance of information security to the e-health environment.
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